Social Learning and Adoption of New Behavior in a Virtual Agent Society by Nye, Benjamin D & Silverman, Barry G
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Departmental Papers (ESE) Department of Electrical & Systems Engineering
2013
Social Learning and Adoption of New Behavior in a
Virtual Agent Society
Benjamin D. Nye
University of Pennsylvania, benjamid@seas.upenn.edu
Barry G. Silverman
University of Pennsylvania, basil@seas.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/ese_papers
Part of the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons, Statistical Models Commons, and
the Systems Engineering Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/ese_papers/704
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Benjamin D. Nye and Barry G. Silverman, "Social Learning and Adoption of New Behavior in a Virtual Agent Society", Presence 22(2),
110-140. January 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/PRES_a_00144
Social Learning and Adoption of New Behavior in a Virtual Agent Society
Abstract
Social learning and adoption of new behavior govern the rise of a variety of behaviors: from actions as
mundane as dance steps to those as dangerous as new ways to make IED detonators. However, agents in
immersive virtual environments lack the ability to realistically simulate the spread of new behavior. To address
this gap, a cognitive model was designed that represents the well-known socio-cognitive factors of attention,
social influence, and motivation that influence learning and the adoption of a new behavior. To explore the
effectiveness of this model, simulations modeled the spread of two competing memes in Hamariyah, an
archetypal Iraqi village developed for cross-cultural training. Diffusion and clustering analyses were used to
examine adoption patterns in these simulations. Agents produced well-defined clusters of early versus late
adoption based on their social influences, personality, and contextual factors, such as employment status.
These findings indicate that the spread of behavior can be simulated plausibly in a virtual agent society and has
the potential to increase the realism of immersive virtual environments.
Disciplines
Electrical and Computer Engineering | Engineering | Statistical Models | Systems Engineering
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/ese_papers/704
Benjamin D. Nye*
Barry G. Silverman
Ackoff Collaboratory for
Advancement of the Systems
Approach (ACASA),
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA 19104
Presence, Vol. 22, No. 2, Spring 2013, 110–140
doi:10.1162/PRES_a_00144
© 2013 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Social Learning and Adoption of
New Behavior in a Virtual Agent
Society
Abstract
Social learning and adoption of new behavior govern the rise of a variety of behav-
iors: from actions as mundane as dance steps to those as dangerous as new ways to
make IED detonators. However, agents in immersive virtual environments lack the
ability to realistically simulate the spread of new behavior. To address this gap, a cog-
nitive model was designed that represents the well-known socio-cognitive factors of
attention, social influence, and motivation that influence learning and the adoption of
a new behavior. To explore the effectiveness of this model, simulations modeled the
spread of two competing memes in Hamariyah, an archetypal Iraqi village developed
for cross-cultural training. Diffusion and clustering analyses were used to examine
adoption patterns in these simulations. Agents produced well-defined clusters of
early versus late adoption based on their social influences, personality, and contex-
tual factors, such as employment status. These findings indicate that the spread of
behavior can be simulated plausibly in a virtual agent society and has the potential to
increase the realism of immersive virtual environments.
1 Introduction
Virtual environments are approaching a paradigm shift from virtual
agents to virtual agent societies. This is a transition toward rich modeling of
the interactions between virtual agents, rather than just agent–user interaction
and agent–environment interaction. This shift has already started in industry
and research applications. The next step is to utilize full-fledged virtual agent
societies in immersive environments, as used by training, teaching, and gaming
applications.
Game environments and agent-based frameworks have steadily expanded
their models of social interaction between virtual agents. Popular open-world
game environments such as Skyrim, Fable, and The Sims use social ties and
interactions to drive agent behavior. SOAR and other long-standing agent
architectures have more recently been used to model social agents (Li et al.,
2008). Newer cognitive agent architectures such as Construct, CLARION, and
PMFServ implement off-the-shelf social dynamics (Schreiber & Carley, 2007;
Sun, 2007; Silverman, Bharathy, Nye, & Eidelson, 2007).
With agents becoming visually and conversationally realistic, the next frontier
of behavioral realism is the interaction between virtual agents. Most commonly,
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multi-agent immersive environments are populated by
behaviorally identical archetypes, scripted individuals,
or a hybrid of these types. This leads to noticeable rep-
etition and monotony. A longitudinal examination of
human–agent interaction by Bickmore, Schulman, and
Yin (2010) identified repetitiveness as a primary user
complaint in dealing with a virtual agent. The traditional
solution to repetition is costly: adding more behaviors
for agents.
Worse, more behaviors do not equal more realism.
Reliance on static action sets inherently reduces the real-
ism of virtual agents in immersive environments: real
societies go through trends with emergent cliques par-
ticipating in similar behaviors. Expanded action sets
alone cannot introduce such trends. As such, adding
more behaviors makes the virtual agents more real
but does nothing to improve the realism of the virtual
agent society. Rather than adding behaviors, social ties
between virtual agents can be used to make behavior
more dynamic.
Social learning and adoption of new behavior can
be used to represent a more realistic virtual agent soci-
ety. Learning makes action sets dynamic, allowing new
behaviors to supplement and replace old ones. It also
allows dynamics such as competing behaviors to emerge.
This process can increase realism in game environments
and extend social simulation to new problems. Agents
in virtual environments lack these capabilities for two
primary reasons:
1. Lack of support by agent architectures.
2. Fear of losing control of the agents.
First, agent architectures typically used to drive virtual
agents lack key mechanisms supporting the adoption of
new behavior. Commercial virtual environments, such
as open-world games, often treat interaction between
virtual agents as window dressing, rather than as a mech-
anism driving game state. Social network simulations
model adoption in terms of structural factors and use
very simple agents, if any (Delre, Jager, Bijmolt, &
Janssen, 2010; Centola, 2010). Complex adaptive sys-
tems models, such as Rogers, Medina, Rivera, and Wiley
(2005), model diffusion patterns due to social factors
but utilize higher-level anthropological and sociological
mechanisms (e.g., homophilly) rather than lower-level
cognitive mechanisms (e.g., attention processes). Cog-
nitive agents capture these lower-level mechanisms, but
their application to studying the spread of behavior has
been limited. Overall, social network models that uti-
lize social factors have not been extensively applied to
immersive environments, except for mechanisms such as
flocking or social contagion.
Second, F. Dignum (2012) hypothesizes that devel-
opers of virtual environments, such as game designers,
are concerned about losing control of the game. Agents
learning and adopting new behaviors pose a clear risk
in this regard: if an agent might learn any arbitrary
action, what would prevent it from acting erratically?
Given that established agent architectures have not yet
answered this question convincingly, this is a genuine
concern. Random or unrealistic adoption trends will
hinder immersion in the virtual environment.
To implement the believable spread of behavior in an
immersive virtual environment, the question is: “what
factors drive social learning by humans?” From the
standpoint of an agent, this boils down to who it learns
from, what actions it prefers to learn, and how this infor-
mation reaches the agent. While these mechanisms are
not well-explored in virtual agents at the cognitive level,
a large body of literature studies the factors that drive
social learning in humans (Bandura, 1986). This litera-
ture was used to develop a biologically inspired cognitive
model for agents. This model emulates the mechanisms
that determine who humans learn from and what actions
they tend to adopt.
Building on this model, a set of agent-based simula-
tions explores the advantages of this approach. These
simulations model two competing actions spreading
in Hamariyah, a virtual Iraqi village based on human
terrain data provided by the U.S. Marine Corps (Silver-
man, Pietrocola, et al., 2009). These simulations extend
the NonKin village framework (Silverman et al., 2012),
using the new cognitive model to drive agents. In this
paper, NonKin is used as a simulation environment,
to examine adoption patterns. However, the NonKin
framework is primarily used to drive agents in immer-
sive training environments, and the results demonstrated
here can be directly ported into an interactive real-time
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3D environment. These simulations highlight the poten-
tial for cognitive agents to enhance the realism and
analytical power of agent-based simulations for studying
the spread of behavior.
2 Socially Learned Behavior: Prior Work
Prior work on adoption of behavior by agents
has not focused on immersive virtual environments, so
this review examines a broader range of socially learned
behavior by agents. Additionally, this research focuses
on descriptive modeling of human social learning, so
this literature review only considers systems that model
one or more theories of human social cognition. This is
an important distinction, since normative agents model
optimal behavior (a rational agent), while descriptive
agents model human behavior. Existing work falls into
two main categories: social-network simulation and
teachable agents.
Social-network simulations have recently been applied
to model the spread of healthy behavior in online
communities, meme utterances, and diffusion of inno-
vations (Centola, 2010; Gruhl, Guha, Liben-Nowell, &
Tomkins, 2004; van Eck, Jager, & Leeflang, 2011). Pure
social-network simulations lack a complete virtual envi-
ronment: agent properties, social ties, and update rules
comprise the full simulation state. In some social sim-
ulations, network topography is the only independent
variable, so the models are sometimes agent-based in
name only. One notable exception is Construct, a multi-
layered social-network architecture (Schreiber & Carley,
2007). Since Construct models agent communication
of information, new behavior is one type of informa-
tion that Construct agents can learn. Construct agents
are part of the larger class of organizational model-
ing (see V. Dignum, 2009, for an overview of related
approaches). However, as an organizational model,
Construct agents focus on high-level group dynamics
rather than individual behavior in a virtual environment.
Complex adaptive systems (CASs) also move beyond
basic networks, using adaptive agents within social net-
work simulations. As a theoretical concept, complex
adaptive systems cover most meaningful agent-based
simulations with any degree of adaptation or emer-
gence (Holland, 1998). However, from a literature
standpoint, CAS simulations that include social learn-
ing typically use lightweight agents and depend on one
or two simple mechanisms that implement normative
theories, such as game-theoretic agents (Panait & Luke,
2005). Voting mechanisms, social norms, and coordina-
tion games have frequently been modeled using these
approaches (Lim, Stocker, Barlow, & Larkin, 2011;
Van Segbroeck, de Jong, Nowe, Santos, & Lenaerts,
2010). CAS approaches are seldom designed to with-
stand scrutiny as individual agents; instead, their power
lies in their emergent patterns (Railsback, 2001). For
an immersive simulation, individual differences between
agents are pivotal, because users will interact with them
and develop expectations. Cognitive agents more com-
monly model these aspects and have been used to drive
virtual agents (Sun, 2007; Silverman, Bharathy, Johns,
et al., 2007; Laird, 2008). However, these agents have
not focused extensively on the spread of behavior, as this
is typically studied at the societal or organizational level.
Teachable and imitative agents are a second major
topic in social learning of behavior (Knox, Fasel, &
Stone, 2009). Agents are taught behaviors for two pri-
mary reasons: to teach the teacher (teachable agents),
or to teach the agent (imitative agents). Unlike social
simulations, teachable agents often represent a range of
domain behaviors that are taught through dyadic inter-
action or small societies. For learning environments,
teachable agents help the user solidify knowledge and
skills through a pedagogy known as learning by teach-
ing. Such agents are increasingly common and have been
applied to the instruction of math, language, and meta-
cognitive skills (Pareto et al., 2011; Blair, Schwartz,
Biswas, & Leelawong, 2007).
In robotics, learning behavior in a physical environ-
ment is a difficult task. To address this challenge, imita-
tive robots have been designed to learn from demonstra-
tions by a human, or by another robot performing the
action (Billard & Dautenhahn, 1999). In some cases,
imitative robots only learn affordances (opportunities
for action), while in other cases, they infer intentionality
and model true imitation (Zentall, 2007). Multi-robot
teams have also used communication-based imitation
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Table 1. Coverage of Contemporary Agents for Learning New Behavior
Level of analysis
Behavior learned Dyadic Micro/meso Macro
Skills (how to) Imitative agents Imitative teams —
Teachable agents
Affordance (what) Imitative agents Agent-based simulation Social simulation
Imitative teams
Intentionality (why) Imitative agents — —
to speed up learning of the behavior space (Barrios-
Aranibar, Alsina, Nedjah, Coelho, & Mourelle, 2007).
In virtual worlds, teachable agents have similarly been
taught language and been trained to recognize behav-
iors (Kerr, Hoversten, Hewlett, Cohen, & Chang, 2007;
Kerr, Cohen, & Adams, 2011).
Table 1 summarizes the type of behavior learned by
different types of agents, and the level of analysis of
the behavior learned. Agents socially learn three dis-
tinct but related aspects of behavior: skills (how to do
it), affordances (what can be done), and intentionality
(why to do it). This research focuses on the center of
the table: using agent-based simulation to model indi-
vidual and group-level social learning of affordances.
Socio-cognitive agents are used to model appropriate
behavioral interactions between agents (at the micro-
level) and the emergent spread of behavior by groups of
agents (at the meso-level). These agents are designed to
learn new affordances: opportunities for action.
Based on these targets, this research attempts to satisfy
three conditions:
1. Realistic agent actions.
2. Social learning about new action opportunities
(affordances).
3. Realistic adoption of actions by agent network
clusters/groups.
The first condition is well-addressed by current lines
of research: many projects exist to make the actions of an
individual agent visibly, audibly, and rationally plausible.
While major challenges remain for bringing individual
agents to the next level, this class of problems has been
explored extensively. This research builds on NonKin
village, a framework that connects to 3D environments
and models patterns of daily life (Silverman et al., 2012).
NonKin was developed as a training environment for
cultural skills, and it handles action representation and
presentation capably. As such, this research focuses on
the second and third conditions.
On its own, the second condition is nearly trivial: it is
easy to support affordance learning by virtual agents, so
long as you don’t care about who learns or adopts the
new actions. Simple social contagion mechanisms are
sufficient to satisfy this condition. However, such mech-
anisms violate Dignum’s constraint, since they “lose
control of the game” (F. Dignum, 2012).
The third condition imposes this constraint: adoption
patterns must be plausible. Unlike the other challenges,
realistic adoption patterns by cognitive agents is a rel-
atively new area. Prior work has not shown that the
spread of behavior in an virtual agent society can be
modeled such that agents continue to act coherently
with their track record of actions. This paper approaches
that problem by developing an agent-based cognitive
model intended to support realistic social learning and
adoption of affordances within an immersive virtual
environment.
3 Modeling Affordance Transmission
To model the spread of behavior, this research
focuses on socially transmitted affordances. The ecolog-
ical approach to perception posits that the environment
is perceived in terms of the affordances that it offers,
referred to as direct perception. Affordances always
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Figure 1. Relationship between affordances and perception.
exist: they represent the potential for action (Gibson,
1986). For example, a human has the affordance to
swing a hammer. A goldfish does not have this affor-
dance, as it has no hands. Autonomous agents often fit
this ecological model: they typically have a static set of
capabilities, but may have a wide variety of opportuni-
ties for action in their environment. As such, agents are
commonly not learning actions in terms of behavioral
movements, but are instead discovering affordances:
their possibilities for action in an environment.
Affordances are not always known, however. As
shown in Figure 1, Gaver (1991) framed this issue using
two orthogonal aspects: (1) Is an affordance available?
and (2) Is the affordance perceptible? For example, a
hidden light switch always offers the affordance to be
turned on by pressing it. However, until the switch is
identified, it represents a “hidden affordance.” A hid-
den affordance is a potential for action that an organism
is not aware of yet. By learning an affordance, an agent
moves from having a hidden affordance to having a per-
ceptible affordance (known affordance). In this way, an
agent becomes aware of a new action opportunity. Social
learning of affordances is important because the space of
possible actions can be vast.
3.1 A Memetic View of Affordance
Learning
For modeling purposes, socially learned affor-
dances were framed as a type of meme. A meme is a unit
of cultural information that spreads by repeated repro-
duction from one agent to another (Dennett, 1995).
A model for meme transmission was synthesized from
Bandura’s social-learning theory and Shannon’s infor-
mation theory as shown in Figure 2 (Bandura, 1986;
Shannon, 1948).
These theories provide complementary processes
for examining the flow of information between and
within individuals, respectively. The social-cognitive
theory establishes the necessary stages for an agent to
repeat socially learned behavior: attention to the behav-
ior, retention of the affordance, motivation to repeat
the behavior, and physical production of the behavior
(Bandura, 1986). However, social-cognitive theory
offers little insight for the transmission of information
through the environment. Information theory addresses
transmission through an environment explicitly, where
a source transmits through a medium to a receiver to
reach a destination.
This framework offers a comprehensive view of meme
transmission in terms of agents sharing a common envi-
ronment. This framework is particularly well-suited to
modeling the spread of socially learned affordances, as
the information of an affordance directly corresponds
to behavior. Additionally, the separation between Ban-
dura’s four cognitive phases of adopting new behavior
helps ensure coherent agent behavior. Since learning a
new action does not entail motivation to repeat it, an
agent learning a new, unattractive behavior would never
reproduce it. This has the dual effect of keeping individ-
ual behavior realistic, while also slowing the diffusion of
that behavior to that agent’s social ties.
Notably, this framework does not explicitly address
directed communication: agents telling each other
about an affordance. This is by intention: agent com-
munication is a behavior. Additionally, the mirror
neuron hypothesis posits that language emerged from
observational learning (Arbib, 2011). As such, verbal
communication may best be viewed as a second-order
process for transmitting affordance information. Many
agent-based frameworks represent communication
as a separate process that is not subject to the same
restrictions as a standard action (Schreiber & Carley,
2007; Panait & Luke, 2005). This framework takes
the opposite view: communication is a behavior that
must compete with the agent’s other opportunities.
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Figure 2. Systems model for meme transmissions.
By implication, this means that communication may
be ignored by its intended recipient or observed by
unintended recipients. Framing communication as a
behavior allows the agent’s environment to determine
its affordances for communication opportunities (e.g.,
who they can talk to, the mediums available, etc.).
While this paper focuses on observational learning,
the framework naturally extends to communication as
well.
3.2 Cognitive-Agent Architecture
Based on this systems model for affordance
transmission, a cognitive model was created using the
PMFServ socio-cognitive architecture. PMFServ imple-
ments cognition using a model-of-models approach:
integrating best-of-breed social science models and
performance moderator functions (PMFs) to form
a cognitive model (Silverman et al., 2012). These
models incorporate the OCC cognitive structure of
emotions (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988), GLOBE
cultural traits (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, &
Gupta, 2004; Hofstede, 2003), Hermann’s leadership
traits (Hermann, 2005), affordance-based perception
(Gibson, 1986), subjective utility (Damasio, 1994), and
multiple other well-supported moderators of cogni-
tion and decision-making. While reviewing its existing
features in detail is beyond the scope of this paper,
PMFServ has a long track record for modeling decision-
making and has been used to drive agents in crowd
environments (Silverman, Johns, Cornwell, & O’Brien,
2006), leader decision games (Silverman & Bharathy,
2005), and country stability simulations that had an
accuracy of over 85% (Bharathy & Silverman, 2010;
O’Brien, 2010).
An attractive feature of the PMFServ framework is
that agents employ affordance-based perception (Silver-
man et al., 2006). However, PMFServ’s standard agent
perceives all of the affordances of its environment and
lacks any cognitive mechanisms for managing attention
and retention of new affordances. To simulate affor-
dance transmission, significant additions to the PMFServ
model base were required. The following section dis-
cusses the theories implemented as models, how these
theories interact with existing PMFServ models, and
how these models help to model social learning and
adoption of new behavior.
3.3 Attention Mechanism
Attention is a fundamental mechanism for social
learning and the spread of new behavior. Without
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Algorithm 1 Attention algorithm
EAtt = { }
for i = 1 to N do
ATTENDED_EVENT = X (E , EAtt)
if ATTENDED_EVENT != No Event Attended
then
EAtt = EAtt ∪ { ATTENDED_EVENT}
end if
end for
attention, a cognitive agent cannot demonstrate the
cocktail-party effect and other cases where an agent dif-
ferentially processes some stimuli over others (Cherry,
1953). In social network models, attention is often rep-
resented as relatively random. However, a multitude of
findings demonstrate that the cognitive mechanisms for
attention to events are far from uniformly random. As
such, attention was driven by a mixture of cues that will
be described in the following section.
This attention model corresponds to a series of
winner-take-all competitions for attention between
simultaneous events, a process that has some support in
neurological research (Lee, Itti, Koch, & Braun, 1999).
Attentional salience determines the probability that
an agent will attend to an event. This is accomplished
by first calculating a salience for each event occurring
during a time step. An additional salience term exists
to represent inattention salience: the salience of back-
ground events not simulated that might be attended to
instead of the simulated events. This vector of saliences
is normalized to form a probability vector, from which
a finite number of events are chosen. Each event is cho-
sen without replacement, except for inattention, which
always remains an option.
The algorithm for drawing the set of attended events
is displayed as Algorithm 1, where N is the maximum
simultaneous events attended, E is the set of all current
observable events, EAtt is the set of currently attended
events, and X (E , EAtt) is a random variable return-
ing at most one unattended event from the set E\EAtt.
The output of this algorithm is EAtt, the total set of
attended events. If X (E , EAtt) returns no event, this
represents inattention and one less total event will be
attended. This attention algorithm is effectively an iter-
ated drawing from the yet-unattended events, with some
probability of no event being attended. Attended events
are processed by the learning model, which can learn
new affordances.
P (e, E , EAtt) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
se
sI +∑e∈E\EAtt se if e ∈ (E \ EAtt)
sI
sI +∑e∈E se if no event attended
0 if e ∈ EAtt
(1)
The probability that an event (e) receives enough atten-
tion to be processed cognitively is determined by the
distribution of X (E , EAtt) and will be referred to as
P (e, E , EAtt). The probability distribution for choos-
ing an event to attend is shown in Equation 1, where
E is the set of all simultaneously observable events,
EAtt is the set of events already attended to, se is the
salience of an individual event e, and sI is the inatten-
tion salience. Events with higher salience are more likely
to be selected, as they fill a greater fraction of the proba-
bility vector. However, for attention to work realistically,
it must be based on appropriate cues from cognitive and
social psychology.
3.4 Attention Cues
Attentional salience is calculated as a function of
attentional cues. Any action involves an actor (source),
behavior (action), and some outcomes (results). The-
ories of attention and persuasion both indicate that
attentional salience is influenced by central and periph-
eral cues (Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo,
1986). Figure 3 displays how an observing agent breaks
an event down into a set of cues that are used to deter-
mine attentional salience. Due to space limitations,
each cue will only be described at a high level, but for
the interested reader, further theoretical and technical
details on their implementation are contained in Nye
(2011).
For an affordance, central information includes
direct information about the associated behavior.
These include whether an agent can perform the
observed action, whether the action resulted in appeal-
ing outcomes, or whether the action seems new. These
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Figure 3. Event attention cues.
influences are known as transferability (Bandura, 1986),
motivated attention (Fazio, Roskos-Ewoldsen, &
Powell, 1994), and novelty (James, 1890), respectively.
Selective attention was also used as a cue, so that agents
could choose to pay more attention to a particular agent
(Simons & Chabris, 1999).
Peripheral cues such as social-factors cues are equally
important for directing attention, however. Social influ-
ence is commonly implemented in social networks, but
is often represented as a single intrinsic agent property.
The problem with this approach is that social influence
is a multi-faceted, relational construct. To address this
issue, social influence was represented by implementing
multiple established theories of social influence.
The social cues implemented were authority (Mantell,
1971), conformity (Tanford & Penrod, 1984), similarity
(Platow et al., 2005), valence (Hilmert, Kulik, & Chris-
tenfeld, 2006), in-groups (Tajfel, 1982), and reference
groups (Kameda, Ohtsubo, & Takezawa, 1997). These
cues represent some of the most well-established factors
of social influence. Authority influence is the additional
influence due to an actor’s leadership or authority posi-
tions. Conformity is the added impact of observing
multiple actors performing the same behavior. Valence is
the amount that an observer likes the actor performing
a behavior. In-group influence is the additional weight
given to a member of the same group. Reference group
influence is the additional weight based on member-
ship in a group that an agent uses as a comparison (e.g.,
keeping up with the Joneses). The following sections
discuss each of these factors in further detail.
The total salience of each event is calculated using
a linear weighted sum of these cues (i.e., se =
w1 × Authority + w2 × Conformity + · · · + w10
× Transferability). Since the relative strengths of these
factors are not well-studied, best guess weights were cal-
culated from their observed effect on either attention,
perception, or retention. A linear sum was chosen based
on the KISS principle, as it was the simplest way to com-
bine cues into a total salience (Axelrod, 1997). While
there are good reasons to believe that some of these fac-
tors interact, psychology literature has not yet produced
the studies that demonstrate how these factors interact.
3.4.1 Novelty (Central). The three central cues
modeled were novelty, motivated attention to out-
comes, and transferability. Novelty indicates how new
a stimulus appears (James, 1890). Novelty decreases
with respect to the number of prior exposures stored
(Johnston, Hawley, Plewe, Elliott, & DeWitt, 1990).
To model this, novelty is calculated as a function of an
agent’s familiarity with each action and agent present
at an event. The novelty model calculates this based on
familiarity levels from the memory model, which will be
described in Section 3.5.
For any given event, the novelty is calculated as the
root mean square of the familiarity values of the actor
of the event and the action of the event. The novelty
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calculation for an event is shown in Equation 2, where
fActor is the familiarity of the event’s actor, and fAction
is the familiarity of the event’s action according to the
memory model.
Novelty(Event) =
√
0.5((1 − fActor)2 + (1 − fAction)2)
(2)
This representation was chosen because it allows a high
degree of novelty if either component is novel. This
dynamic was chosen because it allows representation
of processes such as dishabituation, where adding an
additional stimulus can restore the response to a habitu-
ated (familiar) stimulus. In this context, the response of
interest is active attention. This implementation allows
a return to novelty when a highly familiar person sud-
denly engages in a totally new action. Conversely, if a
straight average was used, then a completely familiar
person could be at most 50% novel. Alternately, tak-
ing the maximum novelty component would give no
extra credit for a new person taking a new action. A root
mean square parsimoniously represents these important
dynamics within the simulation.
3.4.2 Motivated Attention (Central).
Motivated attention refers to the tendency of humans
to pay more attention to objects or events that are rel-
evant to their goals or needs (Fazio et al., 1994). For
example, a hungry person is more likely to notice some-
one eating. Motivational cues are handled by allowing
agents to analyze the outcomes of events that occur in
their presence.
PMFServ’s core cognitive models evaluate their
potential actions based upon activations that determine
the attractiveness of that action, as mediated by their
values and beliefs (Silverman et al., 2006). These mech-
anisms for motivation will be discussed in Section 3.6.
To calculate a factor for motivated attention, an agent
processes an event that results from some other agent’s
action. In processing this event, the agent calculates
the subjective expected utility (SEU) as if the agent had
been the actor in that event and the outcomes were the
same. So, for example, if agent B is eating a sandwich,
the motivational salience for agent A is a function of the
subjective benefit for agent A eating that sandwich (even
if no more sandwiches currently exist to eat).
MotivatedAttention(Event) = 0.5
× (1 + sgn(SEUEvent) × (|SEUEvent|0.25)) (3)
Equation 3 displays the central motivated attention cal-
culation for an agent observing a given event (Note: the
sgn symbol represents the sign function, producing −1
for negative values and 1 otherwise). SEUEvent repre-
sents the SEU of activations that the perceiving agent
would receive had it been the actor in that event and the
outcomes were the same. An adjustment to the raw util-
ity rescales the value from the utility’s range of [−1,1]
to [0,1]. The second rescaling factor takes the fourth
root of the absolute SEU value. This factor was intro-
duced during model calibration to adjust the small range
over which SEU typically operates in PMFServ (about
[−0.05, 0.05]) to cover a motivation range closer to
[0.25, 0.75].
3.4.3 Transferability (Central). The third
central cue modeled was transferability. Transferability
influence refers to the additional influence conferred by
an agent having similar capabilities and doing actions
that could be imitated. Often, this trait is studied in chil-
dren at different developmental stages. Children have
a preference to attend to and imitate those of similar
ability level on tasks (Bandura, 1986).
The transferability influence model allows agents
to process an observed event and determine whether
they could do the same action at the current time. This
determination is only based upon the agent’s current
affordances at the particular moment, not on any past
or potential affordances. This implementation has the
advantage of easily classifying events into those that they
could imitate (transferability = 1) and those that they
could not (transferability = 0).
3.4.4 Authority (Peripheral). Six peripheral cues
were also incorporated into the model, representing
social cues. The authority influence model represents the
additional influence conferred by a position of author-
ity. The effects of authority on behavior have been well
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documented by Milgram (1963) and by Mantell (1971).
PMFServ represents the authority of agents within their
respective groups (Silverman et al., 2006). Since this fac-
tor is already represented, the authority submodel wraps
this factor for use as a social cue.
3.4.5 Conformity (Peripheral). The conformity
model has its theoretical roots in the seminal work done
by Asch (1955). Later work by Tanford and Penrod
(1984) proposed the social information model (SIM),
a probabilistic conformity influence function. Their anal-
ysis produced a curve as stated in Equation 4, where S
is the number of conforming sources, and T is the total
number of non-conforming targets.
ConformityInfluence(S , T ) = e−4×e
−S1.75
T (4)
The implemented conformity model uses this equa-
tion verbatim. However, the context of its usage is
slightly different from that of the original SIM model.
While that model assumed a set of confederates, these
models assume that agents act based upon their own
opinions but still exert influence. As such, any set of
agents engaged in a particular activity forms a group of
influence sources (S). The remaining agents involved in
other activities are the target group (T ). As such, agents
can calculate the conformity influence of any activity
in the simulation for any given action occurring at the
time.
3.4.6 Similarity (Peripheral). The similarity
model calculates a social-influence factor based upon
how much an agent feels it has in common with another
agent. The influence of similarity on attention and influ-
ence has been an important topic in the domains of
social psychology and social-network analysis (Platow
et al., 2005). PMFServ contains a model that estimates
a proxy for similarity, known as Goals, Standards, and
Preferences (GSP) congruence (Silverman et al., 2006).
This estimate is based on the GSP personality model,
which is described in Section 3.6.1. The GSP model
expresses an agent’s personality as a tree of traits con-
nected by weighted links. Each weight determines the
importance of a child trait toward a parent trait (e.g.,
40% of an agent’s goals focus on safety). GSP congru-
ence is calculated by transforming agents’ GSP trees into
vectors of normalized linear weights and calculating the
nearness between these vectors. The standard GSP con-
gruence function is shown in Equation 5, where −→w is
the perceiving agent’s GSP vector,
−→
w∗ is the observed
agent’s GSP vector, and N is the number of elements
in −→w .
GSPCongruence(−→w , −→w∗) = 1 −
∑N
i=1(
−→wi − −→w∗i )2∑N
i=1(
−→wi )2 + (−→w∗i )2
(5)
The similarity influence model builds off of the GSP
congruence model, using GSP congruence as a sim-
ilarity term. By allowing agents to detect this factor
without noise, the model assumes that the agents gen-
erally estimate an accurate perception of similarity. This
model is best applied when agents have prior knowledge
about other agents’ personalities or quickly assess other
agents’ personalities. Even where agents are not familiar,
it provides a useful first-order estimate of the perceived
similarity.
3.4.7 Valence (Peripheral). Valence influence
is caused by general like or dislike of another person
or group. This is related to the halo effect, whereby
an attractive person appears more competent (Kelley,
1955). Works such as Hilmert et al. (2006) have exper-
imentally shown that valence affects social influence.
PMFServ valences are directed properties of one agent
toward another entity. Valence influence exposes these
properties as cues for attention. Since valence ranges
from [−1,1] in PMFServ and all cues are fitted into a
range of [0,1], a small transform is applied to valence
values to rescale and shift them into the appropriate
range.
3.4.8 In-Group (Peripheral). The in-group
influence model represents the social influence based on
membership in a mutual group or clique (Tajfel, 1982).
PMFServ has a structure for representing group mem-
bership, which allows members to be part of a group.
This cue determines whether agents share a common
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group (in-group = 1) or share no common groups
(in-group = 0).
3.4.9 Reference Group (Peripheral).
Reference-group influence represents the influence
based on an agent belonging to a group against which
an agent self-compares, such as a desirable group
(Kameda et al., 1997). PMFServ has an analogous factor
within its model set that is an agent’s internal mem-
bership with a group (Silverman et al., 2006). Internal
membership measures how much an agent desires to
participate and support a group. As this measure is
explained by Eidelson (2007), it will not be covered in
detail here.
Reference group influence uses a variant of PMFServ
internal membership that has been scaled to fit into a
range of [0,1]. This model can report back the desire
to belong in any given agent’s group (if belonging to
a group). This value can be independent of in-group
influence, since people are not always a member of their
preferred group.
3.4.10 Selective Attention. Selective attention
is a construct that refers to the additional probability of
perceiving events performed on an object that an agent
actively perceives, as opposed to other peripheral events
(Simons & Chabris, 1999). Selective attention is imple-
mented by having agents keep a record of the objects
and agents they are actively attending to at the current
time. PMFServ agents are able to actively take actions
on other agents, including actions of active perception
(watching).
SelectiveAttention(x) =
{
1
N if x ∈ XTargeted
0 if x /∈ XTargeted (6)
As such, the selective-attention model records all enti-
ties that an agent is currently engaged in action upon.
This means that selective attention is focused on any
targets being watched or acted upon by an agent. Selec-
tive attention is spread uniformly across these targets
as noted in Equation 6. This allows agents to choose
who will be the target of their selective attention, as is
observed in the cocktail-party effect (Cherry, 1953).
3.5 Retention Mechanisms
Since this cognitive model was primarily intended
to address the issue of who it is that learns and adopts
new affordances, the memory model was kept as simple
as possible. Many affordances of interest are relatively
simple and memory effects are not the main barrier to
adoption. As such, memory was implemented as a sim-
ple associative structure. Associative memory works by
strengthening connections between elements, stimuli, or
constructs due to repeated pairing (Mackintosh, 1983).
This information is used for two purposes. First, this
memory model supports affordance learning. Once an
action is stored in the agent’s memory, the affordance
for that action becomes known. As such, attending to
an event with a new behavior will let the agent learn this
behavior. Second, the model is used to calculate famil-
iarity because this is needed to determine the novelty of
events.
Familiarity(Entity) = 1 − e−rf ×NE (7)
The familiarity equation is stated in Equation 7. The
input to the equation, Entity, is an action, agent, or
other entity contained within a learned pattern. NE is
the number of exposures to that entity and rf is a famil-
iarity rate that determines the steepness of the curve.
Within the current implementation, rf was set to 0.2, as
this allows familiarity to reach 95% after 15 exposures.
Empirical research indicates that the exposure effect hits
its maximum after between 10 and 20 exposures, so this
seemed to be a reasonable familiarity rate (Bornstein,
1989).
3.6 Motivation Mechanisms
The motivation to perform an action is controlled
by PMFServ’s decision model. As PMFServ’s decision
model has undergone over 10 years of development,
fully understanding these processes requires careful read-
ing of a number of prior papers (Silverman et al., 2006;
Silverman, Bharathy, Johns, et al., 2007; Silverman,
Bharathy, Nye, et al., 2007). PMFServ agent motiva-
tion is driven by a process known as cognitive appraisal
theory. In cognitive appraisal, an actor has a set of three
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models: a GSP personality model, an emotion model,
and an SEU decision model. While the models that
drive motivation were not modified for this research,
they are used by the motivational-attention model, and
also determine agent adoption decisions. Due to their
importance in determining what actions are expressed,
the mechanisms of motivation will be discussed in this
section.
3.6.1 Goals, Standards, and Preferences
Model. From the standpoint of affordance adoption,
the most important model is the GSP model, which
stores an agent’s personality. Specifically, a personality
is modeled by a tree of weights (Bayesian prior odds)
that represent the relative importance of each GSP node
(trait) to that person. The GSP nodes used in the exper-
iments in Section 4 are listed in Table 2. The nodes in
this tree are based on Maslow’s Hierarchy (Maslow,
1943), cultural dimensions of organizations (Hofstede,
2003; House et al., 2004), and Hermann’s trait anal-
ysis of leadership styles (Hermann, 2005). Nodes are
split into three main branches: goals (short-term goals),
standards (how to accomplish things), and preferences
(long-term wishes).
GSP tree factors are based on trait theories, which
posit that personality traits are relatively stable over
time. As such, this model captures individual differ-
ences between agents and determines the outcomes
they prefer. However, even agents with the same GSP
tree often display very different behavior due to differ-
ent experiences (e.g., observed events, emotional states),
knowledge (e.g., affordances, familiarity), and exter-
nal contexts (e.g., different roles, economic condition,
location). This results in path-dependent behavior, par-
ticularly in a multi-agent system. For example, if two
initially identical agents compete in a race, one agent
will experience winning and the other will experience
losing. The agents’ behavior will diverge due to the dif-
ferent experiences and any external changes (e.g., prizes,
rewards, changes in perception by other agents).
Agents evaluate their experiences in terms of activa-
tions. Activations are part of the outcomes of actions
that are afforded to agents. Each activation positively
or negatively targets a single GSP node. For example,
gaining money creates positive activations for a materi-
alistic preference. An action that results in pain for the
agent will give negative activations for a safety goal. Sim-
ilar to attention, social models also impact motivation.
As noted earlier, agents have models for group mem-
bership and valence (like/dislike) toward other agents
and groups. Actions that affect an agent’s in-group will
activate nodes such as own_people and for_the_group.
Similarly, an agent’s valence toward an agent or group
influences the activations on the be_relationship_focused
node produced by action outcomes (e.g., hostile actions
toward friends create negative activations on this
node).
3.6.2 OCC Emotion Model. The emotion
model calculates a set of emotions based on the acti-
vations to different parts of the GSP tree (Silverman
et al., 2006). The emotions calculated by this model are
based on the OCC (Ortony et al., 1988) formalization
of emotions. Joy, distress, pride, shame, liking, disliking,
gratification, and remorse are emotions considered by
the decision model. Pairs of positive and negative emo-
tions are determined by positive or activations to each
branch of the GSP tree: goals (joy/distress), standards
(pride/shame), and preferences (liking/disliking). Each
of these emotions is a normalized vector projection of
activation values onto their corresponding node weights
(e.g.,
−−−−−→
Weights · −−−−−−−→Activations). Gratification and remorse
are compound emotions based on the other emotions.
Emotions accumulate as a result of events and decay
over time. For example, as goals are satisfied, the agent
will receive less emotional impact from them, allowing
the agent to focus on other goals.
3.6.3 Decision Model. The decision model cal-
culates an agent’s SEU for each afforded action based
on these emotions (Silverman et al., 2006). The SEU
of an action is determined by calculating the expected
change in emotions from the activations of an action.
Equation 8 displays how the decision model calculates a
subjective utility based on the emotions. The expected
utility is otherwise calculated in the typical way, based
on the probability of action outcomes with different
activation sets.
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Table 2. GSP Personality Factors
Node Name Description of trait
GOALS: Short-term goals, which connect to joy and distress
Individual Overall individual goals, e.g., Maslow (1943) Hierarchy
Belonging Social acceptance and feeling situated among peers
Esteem Feeling of self-efficacy and respect
Physiology Basic bodily needs, such as eating and sleeping
Safety Personal safety and well-being
STANDARDS: Standards for behavior, how an agent prefers to accomplish tasks. Connects to pride and shame.
Conformity_assertiveness Overall importance of conformity and individuality
Assert_individuality Expressing individuality
Conform_to_society Conforming to culture
Respect_authority Showing respect for authority figures
Exercise_of_power_and_culture Overall importance of power balances in actions
Be_controlling Controlling others by using power
Be_open Being open to others, allowing freedom
Honesty Overall importance of honesty and dishonesty
Keep_one’s_word Keeping promises, being honest
Use_duplicity Lying for its own sake
Humanitarian_sensitivity Overall importance of considering lives and showing respect for life
Respect_for_life Respecting and being sensitive to the lives of others
Disregard_for_life Disregarding and being insensitive to others’ lives
Military_doctrine Overall importance of adhering to military codes
Shun_violence Avoiding violence
Use_asymmetric_attacks Attacking unevenly, even unfairly
Use_conventional_attacks Use of force-on-force conventional tactics
Scope_of_doing_good Overall importance of doing good for others
Bring_about_greater_good Doing good in the world, in general
Look_after_narrower_interests Only looking after one’s own interests
Task_relationship_balance Balancing tasks and relationships
Be_task_focused Concentrating on tasks only
Be_relationship_focused Building relationships or social networks
Treatment_of_out-groups Overall importance of interaction with out-groups
Out-groups_are_legitimate_targets Targeting out-groups for discrimination
Enemy_is_out-group Targeting one’s enemies negatively
Friend_is_out-group Targeting one’s friends negatively
Neutral_is_out-group Targeting neutral parties negatively
Treat_with_fairness Treating everyone equally
(continued)
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Table 2. (Continued)
Node Name Description of trait
PREFERENCES: Long-term wishes for the world state. Connect to like and dislike emotions.
Desirable future Actions that produce good outcomes, by scope
For_everybody Benefit for everyone in society
For_the_group Benefit to one’s immediate in-group(s)
For_the_self Benefit for one’s self
People Long-term outcomes for specific people, by relationship
Enemy_faction Long-term outcomes for enemy factions
Friendly_faction Long-term outcomes for friendly factions
Own_people Long-term outcomes for own group
Other_groups Long-term outcomes for neutral groups
Places_and_things Actions impacting objects or states of the world
Materialistic Property and monetary objects
Symbolistic Symbolic outcomes, principles being maintained
Wholistic_spiritualistic Religious or spiritual matters
Utility(Emotions) = 1
4
((Joy − Distress)
+ (Pride − Shame)
+ (Liking − Disliking)
+ (Gratification − Remorse)) (8)
Agents decide on their actions by selecting the option
with the highest SEU in the simulations described in
Section 4. This means that actions compete against each
other to be an agent’s top decision choice. Since an
agent’s emotions depend on their GSP model, agents
with different GSP weights tend toward different types
of behavior. Finally, agents can only consider actions
that they perceive as affordances, so the new attention
and memory models also influence action choices. Until
an agent learns about an affordance, the agent cannot
calculate its utility or choose that action.
3.7 Production Mechanisms
Production mechanisms in PMFServ are repre-
sented by the actions associated with affordances. These
actions depend on the specific scenario and generate
observable events when they occur. The ability to per-
form an action requires a valid affordance for that action
in the environment. As such, the ability to produce an
action is atomic—an agent is either able or unable to
perform an action. As noted earlier, agents are unable to
perform an action unless they are aware of its affordance.
This makes intuitive sense, as an agent cannot initiate an
action without recognizing the possibility of performing
that action (i.e., the affordance).
4 Hamariyah Iraqi Village Simulation
Agents using this cognitive model were used to
populate Hamariyah, an archetypal Iraqi village based
on a human terrain data set. The scenario examines the
spread of adoption of two competing behaviors: giving
information to the U.S.-backed government and vol-
unteering to plant an IED near a government building.
Since this framework had preexisting actions, the spread-
ing behaviors competed against each other and against
the existing action set, which primarily models daily life
activities. These simulations were performed to exam-
ine whether the cognitive agents could fulfill the three
requirements listed at the end of Section 2: realistic
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Figure 4. NonKin 3D environment screenshot.
agent actions, social learning of new actions, and realistic
adoption clusters.
This scenario was generated using the NonKin vil-
lage framework and data provided by the U.S. Marine
Corps (Silverman, Pietrocola, et al., 2009). NonKin
village is a virtual village engine based on PMFServ
agents (Silverman et al., 2012). The NonKin village
can drive agent behavior in a 3D environment or run
faster-than-real-time as a simulation without graphical
support. Figure 4 shows a screenshot of agents con-
gregating in the NonKin immersive environment. This
archetypal village was intended to be representative of
a village in Iraq. The human terrain data set includes
agents’ names, familial ties, group memberships, group
roles, special skills, key personality traits, land owner-
ship, and employment. Groups in the region are also
described, with a focus on their valence relationships
(like/dislike) and historical backstory. Given the scope
of the NonKin Village project, it is infeasible to explore
every aspect in detail. Instead, the following sections will
highlight the key scenario features and extensions that
were necessary to study competing behaviors within the
village. For more detailed information about the sce-
nario, Silverman, Pietrocola, et al. discuss the human
terrain data for Hamariyah and Silverman et al. discuss
the architecture and advanced features. However, the
work described in Silverman, Pietrocola, et al. used an
older version of the NonKin village architecture, so
Hamariyah was regenerated from the original Marine
Corps data.
4.1 Hamariyah Scenario
The Hamariyah scenario contains 72 agents from
the Marine Corps human terrain data. These data were
used to determine the initial values for all simulations,
which will be described here. These agents belong to
three distinct ethnic groups: 11 Heremat members, 38
Shumar members, and 23 Yousif members. As group
ties are established by ethnicity, these memberships are
static. In addition to agents being members of groups,
structures in the NonKin village are tagged by their
group affiliation. This allows agents to see whether
buildings belong to their group, a group they like, or
an unfriendly group. These relationships are determined
by the group-to-group valences, whose starting values
are shown in Figure 5. Agents can also be employed at a
job or can be unemployed. The Heremat group is gen-
erally friendly to the U.S., and controls the local police
force, but is not a very big group. The Shumar ethnic
group is primarily Sunni and unfriendly toward all other
groups, especially the U.S. group. It is the largest group,
with a majority of its members working as merchants
or tradesmen. The Heremat and Shumar ethnic groups
both have members working as part of the local govern-
ment. The Yousif ethnic group is a primarily Shia group,
with higher than 60% unemployment and religious lead-
ers in higher positions of authority. Employment and
group valences may change due to simulation events
(e.g., group-to-group attacks, shops closing, etc.).
Hamariyah contains over 50 standard actions that can
be taken by agents, on a variety of targets. The avail-
ability and attractiveness of opportunities depends on
the context (e.g., location, role, nearby agents), current
internal state (e.g., emotions, hunger, etc.), and their
current information (e.g., known affordances, famil-
iarity). Nothing is scripted, and agents choose actions
autonomously. These actions range from complex multi-
stage actions (i.e., go to market and buy food) down to
niche actions for forcing entry into a building. The orig-
inal set of actions was not modified, as it provided the
contextual backdrop for examining the spread of behav-
ior. The most common actions that agents take within
Hamariyah village are those related to daily life. These
actions include moving from one building to another,
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Figure 5. Hamariyah group valence starting values.
Table 3. Hypothesis Condition: Innovator Agent Demographics
Demographics GiveInformation PlantIED
Number of agents in Shumar ethnic group 1 agent 2 agents
Number of agents in Heremat ethnic group 4 agents 0 agents
Number of agents in Yousif ethnic group 1 agent 4 agents
Number of agents employed 4 agents 3 agents
Average valence toward U.S. (in [−1,1]) 0.07 −0.6
Authority (in [0,1]) 0.17 0.0
entering/exiting buildings, buying food, working,
socializing, praying, and sleeping. Agents are also able
to take less common actions, such as attacks, shootings,
and hiring/firing employees.
4.2 Socially Learned Behavior (Memes)
To examine socially learned behavior, two new
behaviors were added to the Hamariyah Iraqi village:
give information and plant IED. Both of these behav-
iors could only be performed on the government meme
target structure. The giveInformation action represents
acting as an informant to the U.S. Give Information is
the learned affordance that an agent can go to the U.S.
structure to inform on dangerous members in the vil-
lage. PlantIED is an opposite and competing action.
This action involves volunteering to help plant an IED
in the vicinity of the U.S. structure (just volunteer-
ing, not actually performing an action to emplace an
IED). Both actions have inherent risks that give negative
activations for personal safety.
Both simulations were run to convergence, a length
beyond where full learning was typically observed. This
modeling choice means that the experiments under-
estimate the number of holdouts, where holdouts are
the agents that would never learn or express the action.
However, this allows for better examination of relative
expression rates and diffusion. By making agents more
likely to learn and perform the action at some point in
the scenario, the differences between late adopters can
be identified instead of clumping into a large class of
agents who never perform the action.
4.3 Iraqi Village Experimental Cases
The Hamariyah scenario was run under two exper-
imental conditions: a hypothesis case and a randomized
case. These conditions were used to examine differ-
ences in patterns between a carefully selected set of
innovators and patterns from random sets of inno-
vators. The hypothesis case assumed that a particular
set of six agents initially knew each behavior, based
upon the agents’ roles in society. Table 3 shows some
basic demographic information about the agents in the
hypothesis condition. In the hypothesis case, the give-
Information behavior was initially known by six agents
chosen because they were members of the local police or
involved with the local government. Agents in the police
force and government could be expected to be aware of
how and where to provide intelligence to the U.S. forces
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in their area. GiveInformation innovators are primarily
Heremat and slightly like the U.S. group. The plantIED
behavior was initially known by six agents categorized
as anti-U.S. and their kinetic special skills listed them as
an IED maker or an IED emplacer. The plantIED inno-
vators are primarily tradesmen or unemployed, and they
greatly dislike the U.S. This scenario was intended to
represent the transmission of competing behaviors under
realistic conditions.
The randomized condition started with a random
set of agents aware of each affordance, so there was
less initial predisposition to spread the behavior, but it
might reach a wider variety of agents. At the start of each
run, six agents were randomly chosen to start with the
giveInformation affordance and another six agents were
randomly chosen to start with the plantIED affordance.
This condition was intended to examine the patterns of
behavioral transmission that exist when actions are avail-
able to agents who would not normally be expected to
carry them.
4.4 Example of Affordance
Transmission
The cognitive model explained in Section 3.2
determines how agents spread these behaviors in the
Hamariyah village. To help ground this process, this
section offers a small example of an agent socially learn-
ing and adopting the plantIED behavior. Assume three
agents: a Shumar Baathist militant, a Shumar Al Qaeda
Iraqi (AQI) insurgent, and a Heremat shopkeeper.
Initially, only the Baathist is aware of the plantIED
affordance.
4.4.1 Attention Example. The Baathist per-
forms a plantIED volunteering behavior where both
the insurgent and shopkeeper might observe this action.
The attention model for each of these observers breaks
down this event into attention cues, as shown in Table 4.
This table demonstrates that the AQI agent has many
more cues that would lead this agent to pay attention
to the Baathist’s action. Motivated attention, valence;
in-group membership, and reference group cues are
all fairly high for the AQI agent, but low for the shop-
Table 4. Attention Cues for Observers of Baathist PlantIED
Heremat AQI
shopkeeper insurgent
Novelty 1.0 = 1.0
Motivated attention 0.34 < 0.64
Transferability 0.0 = 0.0
Selective attention 0.0 = 0.0
Authority 0.0 = 0.0
Conformity 0.19 = 0.19
Similarity 0.61 ≈ 0.62
Valence 0.0 < 0.5
In-group 0.0 < 1.0
Reference group 0.35 < 0.46
keeper. The motivated attention is higher, because the
AQI agent would also be interested in taking a plantIED
action. The valence is high, because those two specific
agents were designated as friendly during the design
of the village; in-group and reference group values are
high, because the Baathist and AQI agent are both part
of the Shumar ethnic group.
Novelty, transferability, selective attention, author-
ity, conformity, and similarity were fairly similar for both
agents. This is because neither observer knows the affor-
dance (high novelty), neither agent is currently in a
position to perform the action (not transferable), and
neither agent is actively paying attention to the Baathist
agent (no selective attention focus). Authority is zero
for both because the Baathist does not have authority in
any group. Conformity is low because the Baathist agent
is the only one performing plantIED out of the three
agents (e.g., S = 1, T = 2 for Equation 4). Finally,
similarity is comparable because both observers have
personalities that are equally different from the Baathist.
These cues determine the salience for the attention
model. The attention model probabilistically deter-
mines whether each observer pays attention to the
Baathist’s action. These cue sets mean that the AQI
agent is approximately twice as likely to attend to the
plantIED action. As such, for further discussion, it is
assumed that the AQI agent paid attention to the action,
but the Heremat shopkeeper did not.
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4.4.2 Retention Example. Since the AQI agent
attended to the plantIED action, this agent learns from
this event through its memory model. Two changes
occur for the agent. First, the AQI agent can now per-
ceive the plantIED affordance. The agent permanently
learns this knowledge and will select plantIED at any
time where the action is afforded and is the action choice
with the highest SEU. Second, the agent becomes
more familiar with the plantIED action and has a lower
novelty toward that action (from 1.0 to about 0.9).
4.4.3 Motivation Example. The AQI agent
is then able to select the plantIED action during the
decision process, since that agent is now aware of
the affordance. When the AQI agent evaluates the
action, its activations depend on the expected out-
comes. PlantIED means volunteering for a violent
asymmetric attack, so the action provides success acti-
vations for disregard_for_life, use_asymmetric_attacks,
and be_task_focused. Similarly, it has negative activa-
tions on safety, respect_for_life, and shun_violence.
Since the AQI agent has a low valence toward the U.S.
group, plantIED also generates success activations on
for_the_group and enemy_is_out-group.
The AQI insurgent’s GSP model strongly
matches these activations. Its personality gives a
high weight to violent traits (disregard_for_life,
use_asymmetric_attacks, enemy_is_out-group) and
low weight to nonviolent traits (respect_for_life,
shun_violence). The AQI agent also places a very low
weight on safety goals, so is willing to engage in high-
risk actions. This means that the AQI agent should be
highly motivated to select the plantIED action. The
results discussed in Section 5.3.2 confirm this expecta-
tion, as AQI agents were among the earliest adopters of
plantIED.
For comparison, the Heremat shopkeeper would be
a poor match for the plantIED activations. As the shop-
keeper has a positive valence toward the U.S. group,
this agent does not receive any activation for nodes
such as enemy_is_out-group. The GSP for the shop-
keeper also has a high weight for nodes such as safety,
respect_for_life, and shun_violence. As such, the shop-
keeper would have a negative subjective utility for the
plantIED action, and this agent would not generally
perform this action.
However, it should be noted that all agents must per-
form an action regardless of how bad their options are.
So then, if the shopkeeper’s only action choices were to
volunteer to plant an IED or to suffer some cruel fate
with worse activations, plantIED could still be selected.
As such, expressing an action depends not only on its
activations but also on the activations of other actions
available. This also means that seemingly unrelated GSP
nodes can prevent selecting the plantIED action by lead-
ing an agent to prefer other actions, even if the agent has
a positive utility for plantIED. This means that the con-
verse also holds: AQI agents might not select plantIED
due to focusing on actions that are more prefered across
the simulation. These decisions depend on the complex
system of agents and their environment, so they cannot
be directly known a priori.
4.4.4 Production Example. When the AQI
agent decides to perform the plantIED action, the agent
restarts this cycle by performing the action where it
might be attended by observers. These observers process
that event using the processes described in this example,
allowing the affordance to spread as a meme through the
village.
5 Iraqi Village Simulation Analysis
The Hamariyah Iraqi Village environment models
competition between the spread of behaviors: providing
intel to the U.S. (giveInformation) and volunteering to
help anti-U.S. elements plant an IED on a U.S.-owned
building (plantIED). The simulation runs were used to
examine three questions about the realism:
1. Diffusion dynamics—Does social learning follow
social ties?
2. Cluster formation—Do agents form clusters of
adopters?
3. Cluster comparison—What traits determine
membership in clusters?
Data from the simulation runs were analyzed to exam-
ine each of these questions in Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3
respectively.
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Figure 6. Diffusion of innovations curve.
5.1 Diffusion Dynamics
The simulation dynamics give an overview of how
the behaviors spread. Behaviors spread in two phases:
learning the affordance and expressing the action. Both
behaviors spread quickly enough to approach equi-
librium within the simulation time horizon, as noted
earlier in Section 4.2. The learning curve of each behav-
ior follows a punctuated version of the Rogers (1995)
Figure 7. Percent of group learned giveInformation (hypothesis
condition).
diffusion of innovations process, shown in Figure 6.
These patterns indicate a progression of innovators, early
adopters, early majority, late majority (late adopters),
and laggards. Holdouts are individuals who never
adopt and cause the curve to saturate at less than 100%
adoption.
Figure 7 shows the percentage of each group that
learned giveInformation over time, as the mean of the
20 runs done in this condition. The x-axis shows the
Figure 8. Percent of group learned giveInformation (randomized
condition).
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Figure 9. Percent of group learned plantIED (hypothesis condition).
total number of all events that occurred within the sim-
ulation, which correlates with time passing. Events are
used, because agents can only learn by observing some
event. The y-axis shows the fraction of agents who have
learned the behavior. To avoid bias from the initial set of
agents aware of the behavior, this chart only considers
agents who did not start out by knowing the behavior.
To help examine the learning region, this chart is trun-
cated at the point where saturation was typically reached
(all agents aware of the action). Next to it, Figure 8
shows this same statistic for the randomized condition.
Comparing Figure 7 and Figure 8, it is evident that
changing the initial set of agents changes the learning
curve of each group. Under the hypothesis condi-
tion, giveInformation is initially known by a significant
number of Heremat agents. Due to this initial advan-
tage, other Heremat agents tend to learn the behavior
faster. In the randomized condition, this learning advan-
tage reverses and the Yousif group members and the
Shumar group members have advantages in learning
giveInformation. In both conditions, the difference in
learning only holds through the early adopter and early
majority phases. Once the late majority phase starts, no
particular group shows a significant advantage. Despite
which group has an advantage, the diffusion rate is fairly
similar—reaching saturation after approximately the
same number of events.
The same comparison is shown for the plantIED
action, shown in Figure 9 (hypothesis) and Figure 10
(randomized). In both conditions, the Yousif group
Figure 10. Percent of group learned plantIED (randomized
condition).
had an advantage in learning rate. For the hypothesis
condition, a significant number of the initial carriers are
members of the Yousif group. This allows them to bet-
ter spread the behavior among their own group. In the
randomized condition, the Yousif group was also slightly
favored in learning plantIED. This indicates that the
Yousif are in general more likely to learn this behavior.
Additionally, the rate of learning plantIED was greatly
impacted by the starting condition. When given to a
random set of agents, learning takes twice as long to sat-
urate the population and diffusion is more homogenous
across groups (e.g., very similar curves in Figure 10).
It is also slower during the steeper part of the learning
curve, consistently lagging behind. This means that
the starting set for plantIED is more successful in get-
ting awareness of that meme to the population than a
random subset of agents would be.
In general, plantIED was also learned faster than
giveInformation. This may be due to plantIED occur-
ring more frequently than giveInformation. A t -test
was run to test for the probability that there were more
plantIED actions than giveInformation actions for both
experimental conditions. The t -test strongly indicates
plantIED was more common than giveInformation
(p < .01, 19 DOF). A second t -test also confirmed
that the hypothesis condition has a higher frequency of
plantIED than the randomized condition, explained by
the hypothesis innovators being more likely to perform
plantIED than a random set of agents.
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Table 5. Demographic Properties for Cross-Cluster Analysis
Property Data type Description
Group valences
Valence(U.S. group) Continuous Like/dislike toward the U.S. group
Valence(Heremat group) Continuous Like/dislike toward the Heremat group
Valence(Shumar group) Continuous Like/dislike toward the Yousif group
Valence(Yousif group) Continuous Like/dislike toward the Yousif group
Group memberships
Member of Heremat Dichotomous True only if agent in Heremat faction
Member of Shumar Dichotomous True only if agent in Shumar faction
Member of Yousif Dichotomous True only if agent in Yousif faction
Social properties
Authority Continuous Authority of the agent in his/her group
EmploymentLevel Dichotomous If true, agent is employed and typically goes to
work during the day
GSP personality factors Continuous Personality traits
5.2 Cluster Formation of Adopters
This section examines whether agents formed clus-
ters of adopters, and what characteristics made these
clusters distinct. Agents were classified based on two
adoption factors: average time of first learning, and
average time of first expression. Since agents may not
learn or express the behavior, not all agents or clus-
ters have a numeric time value. When an agent was a
nonadopter, the learning and/or expression time value
was technically classified as never during that run. How-
ever, averages and charts require numeric values. Rather
than exclude nonadopters from such analyses, time val-
ues of never were replaced by the final simulation step
(step 3,456). As such, agents and clusters displayed as
adopting on the final time step should be considered
nonadopters.
Using these factors, the mClust clustering algo-
rithm was used to generate an optimal set of Gaussian
expectation–maximization clusters based upon the
pair of variables (Fraley & Raftery, 2003). Gaussian
clustering was applied for this purpose because the clus-
ters formed fairly regular elliptical patterns that were
well-classified using this technique. Clusters will be
referred to by their central means during the discus-
sion, in the form of (first learning time, first expression
time). Also, it should be noted that some clusters appear
as lines when charted because they have little vari-
ance on one axis. This is most notable for the holdout
and early adopter clusters that form at the edges when
graphed.
5.2.1 Cross-Cluster Analysis. To examine the
differences between these clusters, a set of demographic
properties was collected from the agents belonging to
each cluster. The set of properties used for clustering is
shown in Table 5. These properties include GSP per-
sonality factors, group memberships, valences toward
other groups, authority, and employment level. These
factors are introduced in Section 3.6.1, Section 3.4.8,
Section 3.4.7, Section 3.4.4, and Section 4.1, respec-
tively. Due to the large number of GSP nodes, each node
will be briefly described in-text if it has a particular sig-
nificance for analysis; alternately, the reader can refer
back to Table 2 for the full set. Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3
examine cluster formation at a high level and focus on
individual cluster characteristics.
Clusters were contrasted against other clusters in the
same condition. For continuous properties, a one-way
ANOVA was run to detect any significant differences
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Figure 11. GiveInformation clusters (hypothesis condition).
between clusters. For dichotomous variables, a χ2 test
was run to detect significant differences. After this, a
Scheffe post hoc test was applied to examine the spe-
cific differences between individual clusters. A very large
number of differences were significant, p < .05, so only
key identifiers that were most unique to each cluster will
be discussed. Each key identifier was significant at the
.05 level in differentiating a particular cluster, based
upon the Scheffe post hoc test. Section 5.3 contains
the key indicators for learning and adoption that were
discovered through cross-cluster analysis.
5.2.2 GiveInformation Cluster Formation.
The clustering results for giveInformation in the hypoth-
esis and randomized conditions are shown in Figure 11
and Figure 12, respectively. The difference between
these conditions is different not only in the members
of the clusters, but in the number of clusters overall.
The hypothesis condition shows five clusters, while the
random condition shows only two.
The cluster in the lower left hand (0, 256) is the initial
set of agents aware of the behavior, who tend to express
it relatively early. At the upper right hand of the graph
(517, 3448) is a significant number of agents who learn
giveInformation late and most never express it. Of the
Figure 12. GiveInformation clusters (randomized condition).
remaining three clusters, those centered at (517, 993)
and (487, 2580) were diffuse but (581, 1284) was very
dense. The randomized condition was much simpler—
containing only two diffuse groups for learning and
expression located at (412, 956) and (419, 2983). Inter-
estingly, both clusters have similar learning times, but
very different expression times.
Table 6 shows the basic information about each clus-
ter in the hypothesis condition, including its size and
dominant groups represented. Also, each cluster is cate-
gorized into its adoption category. One notable category
is the holdout set. These agents generally did not express
the behavior at all. In this respect, they were not lag-
gards but were typically holdouts for giveInformation.
The randomized condition washed out most of these
clusters, with later adopters and holdouts in one cluster
and early adopters in another cluster.
5.2.3 PlantIED Cluster Formation. PlantIED
shared some similarities in its learning and first expres-
sion dynamics. Figure 13 and Figure 14 show the
mClust cluster graphs for plantIED for the hypothe-
sis and randomized conditions, respectively. As with
the giveInformation, the hypothesis condition showed
cleaner clusters than the randomized condition.
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Table 6. Demographics for giveInformation Clusters (Hypothesis)
Cluster Primary Learning Expression
Cluster location size groups adoption adoption
(0, 256) 3 Heremat Innovator Early adopter
(517, 994) 27 Shumar Late majority Early majority
(581, 1284) 12 Yousif Laggard Late majority
(487, 2580) 19 Shumar, Heremat Early majority Laggard
(517, 3448) 11 Yousif, Shumar Late majority Holdout
Figure 13. PlantIED clusters (hypothesis condition).
Table 7 shows the basic demographics for the hypoth-
esis clusters and their approximate adoption positions.
Even more so than giveInformation in the hypothe-
sis condition, the clusters closely correlate with group
membership. The majority of Shumar and Heremat
learn the behavior later and wait much longer to express
it, if at all. Conversely, a subset of the Shumar and Yousif
quickly move to express the behavior. PlantIED is
interesting in this condition because learning and first
expression track each other quite closely. The agents
who are last to learn this behavior are also the least likely
to want to express it. This is at a contrast with give-
Information, where expression holdouts still learned
Figure 14. PlantIED clusters (randomized condition).
it at about the same rate as other agents. In this case,
attention correlates well with the motivation to imitate.
The randomized condition for plantIED shows inter-
esting behavior. Table 8 shows the basic demographics
for the plantIED action under the randomized con-
dition. While giveInformation was reduced to two
clusters, plantIED still displays five clusters in the ran-
domized condition. However, these are not the same
five clusters. For many of the cases, this is a small reshuf-
fling, but some agents expressed at different times due
to the changes in learning patterns. For example, the
hypothesis cluster at (117, 2931) breaks into two smaller
clusters. One of those clusters (160, 3183) has a much
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Table 7. Demographics for plantIED Clusters (Hypothesis Condition)
Cluster Primary Learning Expression
Cluster location size groups adoption adoption
(0, 116) 6 Yousif, Shumar Innovator Early adopter
(113, 361) 30 Shumar, Yousif Early adopter Early majority
(117, 2931) 23 Shumar, Heremat Early majority Late majority
(124, Never) 13 Shumar, Heremat Late majority Holdout
Table 8. Demographics for plantIED Clusters (Randomized Condition)
Cluster Primary Learning Expression
Cluster location size groups adoption adoption
(146, 190) 17 Yousif, Shumar Early majority Early adopter
(154, 417) 15 Shumar, Yousif Late majority Early majority
(142, 1861) 14 Shumar, Heremat Early majority Late majority
(160, 3183) 11 Mixed Late majority Laggard
(159, Never) 15 Shumar, Heremat Late majority Holdout
longer amount of time before first expression, while the
other includes four additional subjects (142, 1861).
While randomized innovators compress the differ-
ences in learning, small differences persist for plantIED.
The randomized condition shows a correlation between
the time that a cluster learns and when it adopts the
action. This means that agents who are more likely to
perform plantIED also learn it quicker, regardless of
who initially spreads the behavior. These differences
are likely due to factors such as motivated attention and
differences in group size.
5.3 Cross-Cluster Comparison Results
The prior analysis demonstrated that distinct clus-
ters of agents exhibited different learning and adoption
patterns. This section examines the identifying fea-
tures that differentiated particular clusters, based on the
ANOVA and Scheffe tests described in Section 5.2.1.
5.3.1 GiveInformation Cluster Identifying
Features. For giveInformation, group membership and
GSP factors were the strongest determinants of cluster
membership. In the hypothesis condition, the clusters
can be thought of as following three main behavioral
patterns: innovators (0, 256), holdouts (517, 3448),
and fence-sitters (the middle three clusters). The innova-
tor cluster at (0, 256) was small and not very influential.
Notably, it does not include all the agents who start
with the giveInformation action. This cluster has high
valence toward the U.S. group, while all other clusters
have low valence toward the U.S. The innovators are
mainly Heremat, but most Heremat members are part of
the (487, 2580) cluster, making them fence-sitters and
late adopters. These agents are some of the first ones to
learn the behavior, but among the last to try it. One of
the differences between the innovator group and this
cluster is that the innovators give a higher weight to
be_relationship_focused in their GSP.
The holdout cluster at (517, 3448) lies at the opposite
end of the spectrum. Intuitively, one might assume that
the holdouts dislike the U.S. group. Intuition would
be wrong: the holdouts are not very different from
the fence-sitting clusters in their group membership or
valence. The ANOVA analysis indicates that holdouts
place a very high value on personal interests and safety
(i.e., GSP weights for high safety and for_the_self). They
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also have a much lower inclination to control their envi-
ronment, as shown by low importances for esteem and
be_controlling nodes. Overall, this cluster of agents
shares a personality type that is not inclined to take risks.
Considering that becoming an informant is a dangerous
endeavor, these agents would simply rather stay home.
The fence-sitting clusters for the hypothesis condi-
tion differ mainly by group membership. (517, 994) is
a Shumar-dominated group, (581, 1284) is a Yousif-
dominated group, and (487, 2580) is mostly Heremat.
The difference in learning times is explained by the
relationship of each cluster and the Heremat group,
who dominate the innovators. These clusters largely
disappear in the randomized condition, where initial
knowledge is randomized. The meaningful social pat-
terns seen in the hypothesis condition disappear in this
condition. Without the initial social biases, behavior is
learned across groups more evenly.
5.3.2 PlantIED Cluster Identifying Features.
PlantIED had a sharp distinction between each clus-
ter in the hypothesis condition. These four groups can
be thought of as innovators, would-be innovators, late
majority, and holdouts. The (0, 116) innovators of the
plantIED action were prone to expressing the action
because they felt it would benefit their group’s future
(for_the_group, own_group), as well as to satisfy their
esteem goals and assert_individuality standards. They
also place a low weight on safety. They are also primar-
ily Yousif group members, and share a negative valence
toward the U.S. group.
The early adopters at (113, 361) can be considered to
be would-be innovators, due to their strong similarity
with the agents in (0, 116). They mainly differ because
they need to learn the affordance before performing it.
Their long-term preferences are oriented toward sym-
bolic nodes rather than materialism or for_own_group
nodes. This difference appears to be the influence of
AQI members in the cluster. Overall, these agents
waste little time between learning the affordance before
volunteering to plant an IED.
The late majority and holdouts are distinct. The (117,
2931) cluster, which is partially resistant to expressing
the action, is business-oriented and pro-U.S. It places
high importance on growing economic resources (mate-
rialism), conforming to society (conform_to_society),
and positive outcomes for the self (for_the_self). It also
places a higher importance on safety than the IED-active
clusters, but not as high as the other resistant cluster at
(124, Never). It is also the only cluster that conclusively
has a high valence toward the U.S. group.
The holdouts at (124, never) are self-interested
good guys. They have many good-guy personality
traits and are less materialistic and have a high value
on for_the_greater_good. However, key primary
identifying characteristics are high value to safety and
respect_for_life. As a result, this cluster has a major
overlap with the resistant agents for giveInformation.
Overall, the holdouts have low valence toward the U.S.
but are simply unwilling to take risky actions.
The randomized condition shifts the identifying fea-
tures of the cluster slightly. For example, the cluster at
(142, 1861) has a higher employment level and author-
ity level compared to other groups. Additional work
responsibilities may play a role in that subgroup’s delay
in first expression. Most of the prior indicators of early
or late first expression still hold. The next section sum-
marizes the indicators that were reliable for both the
hypothesis condition and the randomized condition, for
learning and first expression times. These will be referred
to as the key indicators for the type of agent and the sit-
uation that leads agents to adopt giveInformation or
plantIED.
5.3.3 Key Indicators: Summary. A summary
of the key indicators that differentiated early learners
versus late learners is listed in Table 9, for giveInforma-
tion and plantIED. From this analysis, the early learners
were differentiated primarily by their social cues (e.g.,
in-group, reference groups, valence) which account for
most of the variance in learning. Motivated attention
was a secondary influence on top of this for plantIED.
Attention cues such as novelty, selective attention,
and transferability did not strongly influence learning
times between clusters. Primarily, these factors were
not indicators because they can vary over an individual
agent’s trajectory rather than differing greatly between
agents. As such, patterns of social learning in this virtual
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Table 9. Key Indicators for Determining Social Learning
GiveInformation PlantIED learning
Key indicator learning time change time change
Same ingroup as innovators Faster learning Faster learning
High valence toward innovator’s group Slightly faster learning Slightly faster learning
Low motivated attention to action No clear connection Slightly slower learning
Innovators express earlier Faster learning Faster learning
environment reflect the preexisting structure of social
cues.
The randomized condition cases showed that a purely
random subset of innovators significantly equalizes the
learning rates, on average. This confirms that social
cues (who does the behavior) provide more consis-
tent indicators than central cues (what kind of behavior
occurred). Finally, all agents learned earlier if the inno-
vators expressed earlier. Since agents cannot learn about
the new behavior except when other agents express it,
this relationship was expected.
On the converse, early expression of behavior is dom-
inated by personality factors. Table 10 shows the key
indicators that help determine whether an agent will
express a behavior earlier or later. Valence toward the
U.S. group is the only consistent nonpersonality key fac-
tor that influences expression of either behavior in this
simulation. Employment may have also been an envi-
ronmental influence that delayed plantIED, but was not
consistently statistically significant. Otherwise, expres-
sion was almost entirely determined by the personality
factors. Safety goals were a key limiting factor for both
behaviors, an obvious connection for dangerous actions.
However, seemingly unrelated factors such as long-term
preferences for_the_self and materialism had a signifi-
cant influence as well. This indicates that these behaviors
are competing with day-to-day activities and pursuing
economic endeavors.
6 Discussion
Experiments with Hamariyah demonstrated the
feasibility of representing realistic adoption patterns
of new behavior in a virtual world. Rather than losing
control over the virtual environment, agents produced
well-formed patterns of learning and adoption of behav-
ior. These patterns were produced by a double-compete
process that mediated the spread of behavior. Compe-
tition at the attention level produced learning patterns
that were based on social cues and motivated attention
to the behavior. Competition at the decision level pro-
duced patterns in adopting each new behavior based on
an agent’s social ties (group valence) and motivation
(personality factors).
6.1 Realistic Spread of Behavior
The NonKin simulation fundamentally works as a
complex system, with significant probabilistic and path-
dependent effects on adoption. Nominally, these effects
prevent predictive and repetitive behavior that users cite
as a problem with virtual agents (Bickmore et al., 2010).
However, users of a virtual environment will lose their
sense of immersion if the overall patterns of adoption fail
to follow reasonable patterns. Three aspects of the pat-
terns will be discussed here: diffusion, cluster detection,
and cluster prediction.
The diffusion patterns indicated that the behaviors
spread plausibly through the population. The high-
level dynamics demonstrated a punctuated version of
the adoption curve expected for diffusion of innova-
tions (Rogers, 1995). These patterns also indicate that
the spread was more realistic when the initial innovators
were chosen based on their personal traits and social ties,
rather than chosen randomly. This indicates that social
learning effectively helped agents transmit behavior
within their group and to friendly agents. These patterns
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Table 10. Key Indicators for First Expression (Adopting Behavior)
GiveInformation first PlantIED first
Key indicator expression time expression time
↑ Valence toward U.S. Earlier expression Later expression (or none)
GSP goals (short-term values)
↑ Safety Prevents expression Prevents expression
↑ Esteem — Earlier expression
GSP standards (preferred methods)
↑ Assert individuality Earlier expression Later expression
↑ Be task focused Later expression Earlier expression
↑ Be relationship focused Earlier expression Later expression
↑ Be controlling Earlier expression Earlier expression
↑ Bring about greater good Earlier expression —
↑ Use asymmetric attacks — Earlier expression
GSP preferences (long-term wants)
↑ For own group — Earlier expression
↑ For the self Later expression Later expression
↑ Materialistic Later expression Later expression
↑ Symbolic Earlier expression Earlier expression
also indicate that plantIED was a more popular action
than giveInformation. As noted previously in Figure 5,
most agents in the simulation have a low valence toward
U.S. group so negative actions against them should be
more common. Agents were also slightly more likely to
learn actions they preferred, showing the influence of
motivated attention.
Analysis to detect adoption clusters also yielded a pos-
itive result: agents produced well-formed clusters of
behavior based on their social influences, personality,
and context (e.g., employment level). These clusters rep-
resent clear patterns of early versus late adoption, as well
as innovators and holdouts. Agents display reasonable
patterns of agents gravitating toward either giveInfor-
mation or plantIED, as well as patterns of holdouts
avoiding both behaviors entirely. Comparison of the
hypothesis and randomized conditions demonstrated
that meaningful selection of the behavior innovators
makes these clusters better defined and more plausible.
Finally, statistically comparing the clusters produced
indicators with predictive value about an agent’s cluster.
These indicators are based on the scenario’s initial values
rather than its runtime values, which may change over
time. The key indicators for these patterns had a high
degree of face-validity, such as holdouts being unwill-
ing to take dangerous actions. Identifying key indicators
means that a virtual society designer can predict when
different agents would learn and adopt a behavior. For
a larger multi-agent environment, a smaller set of repre-
sentative agents can be evaluated to examine the cluster
indicators. These indicators can be used to classify new
agents added to the virtual society, in order to estimate
their expected adoption behaviors.
As such, the spread of behavior can be modeled with
high fidelity with respect to who learns and adopts new
behavior. This analysis showed that the model was effec-
tive for representing competition of behaviors spreading
within the fictional Hamariyah Iraqi village. It was
possible to determine not only the diffusion of each
behavior within the population, but also the key iden-
tifying factors that determined why agents adopted a
given behavior.
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6.2 Modeling and Simulation Findings
While these simulations used a fictional village,
the cognitive model was also designed to simulate real-
world scenarios (Nye, 2012). As such, social simulations
based on this model could offer insight into the real-
life adoption patterns. Even for the Hamariyah village,
the key indicators gave some interesting insights that
connect with theories of counterinsurgency.
GiveInformation adoption was associated with a
low weight for personal safety and a high weight for
relationship-oriented problem solving. However, based
on the personality traits used to create the scenario,
agents who valued relationship-oriented problem solv-
ing also valued their personal safety highly. This implies
that adequate security is pivotal to securing informants.
This finding is supported by some counterinsurgency
analysts, who view security as essential even in a hearts-
and-minds campaign (Krepinevich, 2005). Secondly,
employment level was not found to be a significant
factor for volunteering to participate in IED activi-
ties. While work-related tasks might delay volunteering
slightly, if agents are willing to risk their lives, then they
are also willing to find time to do so. This is concor-
dant with research such as Berman, Felter, and Shapiro
(2009), who state that higher employment does not
appear to decrease the likelihood of violent rebellion
activities that result in civilian deaths.
While it is important not to extrapolate too much
from the results of a virtual training scenario, these find-
ings indicate some potential for significant analytical
value by applying this approach to real-life scenarios.
For this potential to be realized, a village would need to
be calibrated and validated using data based on a spe-
cific real-life scenario. Additionally, second-order effects
such as external influences and communication mediums
would be important for studying a village situated in a
larger social system. While gathering data for modeling a
specific case study is challenging, other projects based on
the PMFServ architecture have previously used a system
of structured subject-matter experts and databases to
generate scenarios for forecasting purposes (Silverman,
Bharathy, & Kim, 2009; Bharathy & Silverman, 2010;
O’Brien, 2010).
7 Conclusions and Future Directions
This research is part of a larger class of topics that
increase realism by focusing on the realistic patterns
of a virtual agent society, rather than on an individual
agent. This paradigm shift from virtual agents to vir-
tual agent societies is a significant trend within virtual
environments. Representing and studying the spread
of behavior among virtual agents is an important direc-
tion for the realism of immersive environments. Using
cognitively-based agents, this work demonstrated that
plausible patterns of learning and adoption of behavior
can be added to an immersive training environment.
An open question is how to extend this work to model
the abandonment of behavior, which has recently been
explored by social psychologists (Berger & Heath,
2007). Real societies are dynamic, with new trends and
cliques of behavior forming and disbanding. Cognitive
models that emulate human abandonment of behavior
would be a logical next step for supporting dynamic
trends in behavior by virtual agents. Particularly for
long-running immersive environments, such as massively
multiplayer online (MMO) systems and virtual worlds,
extinction of behavior may be of equal importantce as
adoption.
This model should also have value for social sim-
ulation. Observational learning, multi-layered social
cues, and contextual social learning have not been
well-examined using social simulations. A signifi-
cant challenge to such research is the amount of data
necessary to initialize detailed agents, who require
numerous measures of personality and social relation-
ships. However, given the potential benefits of using
social simulation to predict classes of adopters down to
the individual level, this direction fills a role not fully
addressed by existing approaches.
A final direction is to survey user reactions to
these adoption patterns, studying user perceptions of
immersion in the NonKin environment. This work
demonstrates that cognitive agents can plausibly model
adoption patterns, rather than relying on static action
sets or simple random patterns. However, the level
to which these patterns improve realism and reduce
perceived repetition must still be explored. Presence
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questionnaires and other measures can provide valuable
insight into these issues (Witmer & Singer, 1998; Jen-
nett et al., 2008). Perceptions of system efficacy, such
as immersion, have been shown to influence perfor-
mance outcomes in training environments (Jia, Bhatti,
& Nahavandi, 2012). Quantifying the impact of behav-
ioral trends on immersion would help define their role in
training and gaming environments.
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